

**SYSTEM, DEVICE, AND METHOD FOR CONTROLLING ACCESS
IN A MULTICAST COMMUNICATION NETWORK**

5

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates generally to communication systems, and more particularly to controlling access to a shared multicast distribution tree in a multicast communication network.

10

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

In today's information age, communication networks are often used for transporting information from an information provider to one or more information consumers.

One technique for transporting information from an information provider to a group of information consumers over the communication network is known as "multicasting." Multicasting allows the information provider (referred to hereinafter as a "multicast source") to transmit a single unit of multicast information (referred to hereinafter as a "multicast packet") simultaneously to all information consumers (referred to hereinafter individually as a "multicast client" and collectively as "multicast clients") in the multicast group, specifically by addressing the multicast packet to the multicast group using a multicast address. The multicast clients monitor the communication network for multicast packets addressed to the multicast group.

25

In order to distribute multicast packets from a particular multicast source S to the multicast clients for a particular multicast group G, the multicast packet is routed through the communication network by a number of routers. The communication network may include multiple routing domains, and therefore the multicast packet may traverse multiple routing domains. Each router runs various routing protocols to determine, among other things, a "next hop" for each packet based upon address information in the packets. Such routing information is used to establish a multicast distribution tree (referred to hereinafter

30

as the “shared tree”), and is maintained by each router in one or more routing tables (often referred to as a “routing information base”).

5 One problem that plagues many multicast communication networks is security, or more specifically, the lack thereof. Many multicast communication networks are based upon an anonymous receiver model in which any host can join the shared tree, for example, using a group management mechanism such as the Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) as described in Fenner, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments (RFC) 2236 entitled Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 2 (November 1997) and in Cain et al., Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Internet Draft draft-ietf-idmr-igmp-v3-04.txt entitled Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 3 (June 2000), which are hereby incorporated herein by reference in their entireties. This anonymous receiver model exposes the shared tree to various types of attacks.

10 One attempt to protect the shared tree involves the use of data encryption to prevent unauthorized hosts from accessing multicast data. For data encryption, a group-wide encryption key (referred to hereinafter as the “group key”) is used to encrypt and decrypt all multicast data for a particular multicast group. The group key is distributed to the multicast source as well as to all authorized multicast clients (hosts). The multicast source uses the group key to encrypt the multicast data, while all authorized multicast clients use the group key to decrypt the multicast data. Unauthorized hosts that receive the encrypted multicast data are unable to decrypt the multicast data, and are therefore prevented from accessing the multicast data.

15 Another attempt to protect the shared tree involves the authentication of control messages between multicast routers. Specifically, the multicast routers exchange various control messages for, among other things, joining the shared tree. These control messages are authenticated hop-by-hop according to a predetermined authentication scheme. By authenticating all control messages, only authorized multicast routers are able to join the shared tree.

20 Unfortunately, neither data encryption nor control message authentication prevents an unauthorized host from joining the shared tree and thereby consuming valuable communication resources. Because authentication operates only between the multicast

30

5 routers, an unauthorized host can still join the shared tree, specifically by sending a join request, for example, using IGMP or other group management mechanism. The multicast routers establish the appropriate multicast routes for routing multicast packets to the unauthorized host, perhaps even using authentication to perform hop-by-hop authentication. As a member of the shared tree, the unauthorized host receives multicast packets. This is true even if the multicast packets are protected using data encryption, in which case the unauthorized host simply discards the encrypted multicast data.

Thus, a technique for controlling access in a multicast communication network is needed.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

10 A distributed host authentication scheme is used to prevent an unauthorized host from joining a shared multicast distribution tree. The host accesses the shared tree through a designated device. In order to join the shared tree, the host obtains access information from a key server. Certain access information is distributed to at least the designated device, although the access information may also be distributed to other devices. The designated device uses the access information to authenticate the host and establish a security agreement with the host. Other devices may use the access information to authenticate the host in the event that the designated device is unable to authenticate the host. An authenticated host is added to the shared tree, while a host that cannot be authenticated is prevented from joining the shared tree.

15 In an exemplary embodiment of the invention, the shared tree is a Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) tree. The designated device is a PIM designated router (DR) through which the host accesses the shared tree. In order to join the shared tree, the host obtains access information from a key server. Certain access information is distributed to at least the DR, although the access information may also be distributed to other devices, such as a rendezvous point (RP) device and various intermediate PIM devices between the RP and the DR. The DR uses the access information to authenticate the host and establish a security agreement with the host. Other devices may use the access information to

20
25
30

authenticate the host in the event that the DR is unable to authenticate the host. An authenticated host is added to the shared tree, while a host that cannot be authenticated is prevented from joining the shared tree.

5

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The foregoing and other objects and advantages of the invention will be appreciated more fully from the following further description thereof with reference to the accompanying drawings wherein:

10

FIG. 1 is a network diagram showing an exemplary PIM communication network in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 2 is a communication message diagram showing the relevant fields of an exemplary GKM message for distributing access information to the host in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

15

FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing the fields of an exemplary access token in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 4 is a logic flow diagram showing exemplary key server logic in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

20

FIG. 5 is a logic flow diagram showing exemplary host logic in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 6 is a logic flow diagram showing exemplary designated router logic for joining the shared tree in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

25

FIG. 7 is a logic flow diagram showing exemplary designated router logic in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention using an "on demand" mechanism for obtaining access information by the designated router; and

FIG. 8 is a logic flow diagram showing exemplary multicast router logic for authenticating a join request in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.

30

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF A PREFERRED EMBODIMENT

An embodiment of the present invention uses a distributed host authentication scheme to prevent unauthorized hosts from joining the shared tree. This distributed host authentication scheme is in addition to data encryption and control message authentication.

In the distributed host authentication scheme of an embodiment of the present invention, host authentication is performed by an access device through which the host accesses the shared tree. Specifically, an authorized host obtains access information for joining a particular multicast group, for example, from a key server. The access information includes, among other things, an authentication key. Certain access information, including the authentication key, is also sent to the access device, for example, by the key server. Before allowing the host to join the shared tree, the access device authenticates the host using the access information, for example, when the host sends an IGMP join request to the access device. The host and the access device may also establish a security agreement using the access information. The security agreement defines various security parameters for subsequent communications between the host and the access device.

Various aspects of the present invention are described herein with reference to a Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) communication network. PIM is a well-known protocol for routing multicast packets within a multicast routing domain. PIM is so named because it is not dependent upon any particular unicast routing protocol for setting up a multicast distribution tree within the multicast routing domain. PIM has two modes of operation, specifically a sparse mode and a dense mode. PIM Sparse Mode (PIM-SM) is described in Estrin et al., Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request For Comments (RFC) 2362, Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM): Protocol Specification (June 1998), which is hereby incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. PIM Dense Mode (PIM-DM) is described in Deering et al., Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Internet Draft draft-ietf-pim-v2-dm-03.txt, Protocol Independent Multicast Version 2 Dense Mode Specification (June 7, 1999), which is hereby incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

In accordance with the PIM protocol, the various routers within a particular PIM domain establish a default multicast distribution tree, referred to as a "shared tree," for each multicast group. Each shared tree is rooted at a Rendezvous Point (RP) router (i.e., the central device) that acts as the distribution point of all multicast packets for the

5 multicast group. Before a router can join the shared tree for a particular multicast group, the router must learn the identity of the multicast group RP router. A router learns the identity of the multicast group RP router by receiving a PIM Bootstrap Message including a list of all RP routers in the PIM domain. The router receives the PIM Bootstrap Message either from a Bootstrap Router (BSR), which sends the PIM Bootstrap Message to all

10 routers in the PIM domain at predetermined intervals (typically every 60 seconds), or from a neighboring router, which sends the PIM Bootstrap Message to the router if and only if the neighboring router has lost contact with the router for a predetermined period of time (typically 105 seconds). Upon learning the identity of the multicast group RP router, or at any time thereafter, each router that supports a downstream multicast group member (i.e.,

15 multicast client) joins the shared tree by sending a PIM Join/Prune Message hop-by-hop toward the multicast group RP router. Each intermediate router that receives the PIM Join/Prune Message from a downstream router also joins the shared tree by forwarding the PIM Join/Prune Message toward the multicast group RP router.

Typically, a PIM router joins the shared tree when a downstream multicast client

20 joins the shared tree. Specifically, each host accesses the shared tree through a PIM router that is referred to as the Designated Router (DR) for that host (i.e., the access device). The host and the DR support a multicast group management protocol, such as IGMP. In order to join the shared tree, the host sends a join request to the DR using the multicast group management protocol, and the DR forwards a PIM join message upstream towards the RP.

25 Each PIM router that receives the PIM join message establishes the appropriate multicast routes for routing multicast packets to the host, and also joins the shared tree (if it is not already joined to the shared tree) by forwarding the PIM join message upstream towards the RP.

Data encryption may be used to prevent unauthorized hosts from accessing

30 multicast data. For data encryption, a group-wide encryption key (referred to hereinafter

as the “group key”) is used to encrypt and decrypt all multicast data for a particular multicast group. The group key is distributed to the multicast source as well as to all authorized multicast clients (hosts). The multicast source uses the group key to encrypt the multicast data, while all authorized multicast clients use the group key to decrypt the multicast data. Unauthorized hosts that receive the encrypted multicast data are unable to decrypt the multicast data, and are therefore prevented from accessing the multicast data.

Authentication may be used to prevent unauthorized routers from joining the PIM shared tree. For PIM authentication, all PIM control messages are authenticated hop-by-hop from the DR to the RP, as described in Wei, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Internet Draft draft-ietf-pim-v2-auth-00.txt, Authenticating PIM Version 2 Messages (November 11, 1998), which is hereby incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. PIM authentication is performed using IPsec AH and a symmetric encryption key that is shared by all routers in the PIM domain (referred to hereinafter as the “equal-opportunity key”), as described in Kent et al., Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments (RFC) 2401, Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol (November 1998), which is hereby incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. By authenticating all PIM control messages, only authorized PIM routers are able to join the shared tree.

FIG. 1 shows an exemplary PIM communication network 100. The exemplary PIM communication network 100 includes key server (118), BSR (120), RP (106), intermediate PIM router (108), multicast source S (102), two multicast hosts H1 (112) and H2 (116), and three designated routers DR (104), DR1 (110), and DR2 (114). The multicast source S (102) accesses the shared tree via DR (104). The multicast host H1 (112) accesses the shared tree via DR1 (110). The multicast host H2 (116) accesses the shared tree via DR2 (114). The three designated routers DR (104), DR1 (110), and DR2 (114) are coupled through RP (106) and the intermediate PIM router (108).

In an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, an authorized host is allocated certain access information, including, among other things, an authentication key, that can be used to identify and authenticate the host. Some access information, including the authentication key, is also distributed to at least the DR associated with the host. The access information is used by the host and the DR to authenticate the host, for example,

when the host sends an IGMP join request to the DR to join the shared tree for a particular multicast group. If the IGMP join request is authentic, then a security agreement is established between the host and the DR for protecting subsequent control message exchanges between the host and the DR, and the DR joins the PIM shared tree by sending a PIM join message upstream toward the RP. If the IGM join request is not authentic, then the DR rejects the IGMP join request without joining the PIM shared tree.

The access information is distributed to the host over a secure communication channel. The access information is typically distributed to the host using a key distribution protocol that is scalable, secure, and independent of the underlying unicast and multicast routing protocols. Because the host already uses a group key management (GKM) protocol to obtain a group key for data encryption from a secure key server, it is preferable for the host to also use the GKM protocol to obtain the access information from the key server. Specifically, the host uses the GKM protocol to request the group key from the key server. Upon receiving the request from the host using the GKM protocol, the key server authenticates the host and, assuming the host is authorized to receive the group key, generates an access token including the access information for the host and sends both the group key and the access token to the host using the GKM protocol.

FIG. 2 shows the relevant fields of an exemplary GKM message 200 for distributing the access information to the host. The GKM message 200 includes, among other things, a group key 202 and an access token 204. The group key 202 is an encryption key that is used by the multicast source for encrypting multicast data and by the multicast clients (hosts) for decrypting multicast data. The access token 204 includes access information for a particular host to access a particular multicast group. The GKM message 200 is sent by the key server 118 to the host over a secure communication channel.

FIG. 3 shows the fields of an exemplary access token 204. The access token 204 includes a group identifier 302, a host identifier 304, a token identifier 306, an authentication key 308, an expiration date 310, a server identifier 312, and a server public key 314. The group identifier 302 identifies the multicast group to which the access token 204 applies. The host identifier 304 identifies the host to which the access token 204

5 applies. The token identifier 306 is a random 32-bit number that identifies the access token 204. The authentication key 308 is a symmetric encryption key that is used to authenticate the host and establish a security agreement between the host and the DR. The expiration date 310 indicates an expiration (i.e., use by) date for the access token 204. The server identifier 312 identifies the key server that generated the access token 204 (which, in this example, is the key server 118). The server public key 314 is a cryptographic public key associated with the key server identified by the server identifier 312.

10 It should be noted that the access token 204 is for a particular host to access a particular multicast group. In other words, the access token 204 corresponds to a particular host/group pair. The host must obtain a different access token for each multicast group that it joins.

15 Certain access information is also distributed to at least the DR over a secure communication channel. This access information typically includes at least the group identifier, token identifier, and authentication key, but may include other access information such as the host identifier, expiration date, server identifier, and/or server public key.

20 In an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, the key server 118 periodically distributes access information for various host/group pairs to all PIM routers in a particular PIM domain or subnetwork that includes the DR, preferably using using a multicast distribution mechanism. Specifically, a special multicast group (referred to hereinafter as the "all routers group") is established for all multicast routers in a particular PIM domain or subnetwork, and all multicast routers in the all routers group join the multicast distribution tree. The key server 118 distributes a special encryption key (referred to hereinafter as the "router key") to all routers in the all routers group, for
25 example, using public key encryption, and uses the router key to encrypt access information. The encrypted access information is then distributed to the all routers group. The multicast routers in the all routers group use the router key to decrypt the access information. Each multicast router maintains the access information in an access information database that includes access information for various host/group pairs.

Thus, when the host requests a group key from the key server 118, the key server 118 authenticates the host, generates access information for the host, and sends access information to both the host and the DR. FIG. 4 shows exemplary key server logic 400 for distributing access information. Beginning at block 402, and upon receiving a request from the host, the logic authenticates the host, in block 404, to determine whether the host is authorized to access the shared tree. Assuming the host is authorized to access the shared tree, the logic then generates access information for the host, in block 406. The logic sends the group key and the access information to the host, in block 408, for example, using the GKM protocol over a secure communication channel. The logic also sends certain access information to the DR, in block 410, for example, using a unicast or multicast distribution mechanism. The key server logic 400 terminates in block 499.

After obtaining access information for a particular multicast group, the host attempts to join the shared tree for the multicast group. Specifically, the host checks the expiration date for the access token to determine whether or not the access token has expired. If the access token has not expired, then the host sends a join request to the DR including the token identifier for the access token. If the access token has expired, then the host obtains a new access token from the key server 118 by sending a request to the key server 118 for a group key, and then sends a join request to the DR including the token identifier for the new access token.

FIG. 5 shows exemplary host logic 500 for joining the shared tree. Beginning at block 502, and upon obtaining access information for the multicast group, in block 504, the logic checks the expiration date to determine whether or not the access token has expired, in block 506. If the access token has not expired (NO in block 508), then the logic generates a join request using the access information, in block 512, and sends the join request to the DR, in block 514. If the access token has expired (YES in block 508), then the logic obtains new access information for joining the multicast group, in block 510, generates a join request using the new access information, in block 512, and sends the join request to the DR, in block 514. The join request includes a token identifier for the access information. The logic 500 terminates in block 599.

When the DR receives a join request from the host including a token identifier, the DR uses the token identifier to obtain access information for the host/group pair from its access information database. The access information typically includes, among other things, the group identifier and the authentication key. The access information may also include the expiration date for the access token, in which case the DR checks the expiration date and rejects the join request if the access token has expired. Assuming the access token has not expired, then the DR authenticates the join request using the authentication key, for example, using IPsec AH. Assuming the join request is authentic, then the DR uses the authentication key to establish a security agreement with the host, which typically involves establishing a symmetric encryption key for protecting subsequent communications between the host and the DR. The DR also forwards a PIM join request upstream toward the RP and joins the shared tree on behalf of the host.

FIG. 6 shows exemplary DR logic for joining the shared tree. Beginning at block 602, and upon receiving a join request from the host including a token identifier, in block 604, the logic retrieves access information for the host/group pair from the access information database based upon the token identifier, in block 606. If the logic fails to find the access information in the access information database (NO in block 608), then the logic terminates in block 699 without adding the host to the shared tree. If the logic finds the access information in the access information database (YES in block 608), then the logic may check the expiration date for the access token to determine whether or not the access token has expired, in block 610. If the access token has expired (YES in block 612), then the logic terminates in block 699 without adding the host to the shared tree. If the access token has not expired (NO in block 612), then the logic authenticates the join request using the access information, in block 614. If the join request is not authentic (NO in block 616), then the logic terminates in block 699 without adding the host to the shared tree. If the join request is authentic (YES in block 616), then the logic may establish a security agreement with the host using the access information, in block 618. The logic also forwards a PIM join request upstream toward the RP and joins the shared tree on behalf of the host, in block 620. The logic 600 terminates at block 699.

In the exemplary embodiments described above, certain access information for a particular host/group pair is distributed by the key server 118 to all multicast routers in a PIM domain or subnetwork using a multicast distribution mechanism. However, the present invention is in no way limited to distributing the access information to all multicast routers in a PIM domain or subnetwork using a multicast distribution mechanism. The access information may be distributed to one or more multicast routers using any means, including unicast, multicast, and broadcast distribution mechanisms.

Thus, for example, the key server 118 may distribute the access information to an individual multicast router using a unicast distribution mechanism. Specifically, a secure communication channel is established between the key server 118 and the multicast router. The key server 118 then downloads the access information to the multicast router over the secure communication channel.

The key server 118 may also distribute the access information to one or more individual multicast routers using a broadcast distribution mechanism. Specifically, the key server 118 encrypts the access information, for example, using a router key, and broadcasts the encrypted access information. Many network devices may receive the broadcast messages. However, only multicast routers that have the router key can decrypt the access information.

The access information may also be distributed from router to router through the use of control messages sent between neighboring routers. The multicast routers typically support a multicast routing protocol (e.g., PIM) that enables each multicast router to identify and communicate with its neighboring multicast router(s). The access information may be propagated from router to router using the multicast routing protocol, and specifically using inter-router control messages. For example, a multicast router may forward the access information to one or more downstream neighboring routers upon receiving the access information from an upstream neighboring router.

When the key server 118 distributes access information to the multicast routers, for example, using the multicast distribution mechanism described herein, it is possible for one or more multicast routers to fail to receive the access information. Thus, a particular multicast router may have no access information for a particular host/group pair, or the

multicast router may have obsolete (expired) access information for a particular host/group pair. The multicast routers typically delete any obsolete (expired) access information from their respective access information databases.

Thus, when the DR receives a join request from the host, the DR may or may not have access information for authenticating the join request. If the DR has no access information for the host/group pair or has obsolete access information for the host/group pair, then the DR is unable to authenticate the join request, and therefore the host is unable to join the shared tree.

One solution is for the DR to dynamically obtain access information for the host/group pair, for example, by sending a request to the key server 118 upon receiving the join request from the host. The DR may include the token identifier from the join request in its request to the key server 118, in which case the key server 118 sends access information for the identified access token if such access information is available. In this way, the multicast router obtains the most recent access information when it is needed.

FIG. 7 shows exemplary DR logic 700 for joining the shared tree using an "on demand" mechanism for obtaining access information. Beginning at block 702, and upon receiving a join request from the host including a token identifier, in block 704, the logic retrieves access information for the host/group pair from the access information database based upon the token identifier, in block 706. If the logic fails to find the access information in the access information database (NO in block 708), then the logic requests access information from the key server, in block 713, and proceeds to block 714. If the logic finds the access information in the access information database (YES in block 708), then the logic may check the expiration date for the access token to determine whether or not the access token has expired, in block 710. If the access token has expired (YES in block 712), then the logic requests access information from the key server, in block 713, and proceeds to block 714. If the access token has not expired (NO in block 712), then the logic proceeds to block 714.

In block 714, the logic authenticates the join request using the access information. If the join request is not authentic (NO in block 716), then the logic terminates in block 799 without adding the host to the shared tree. If the join request is authentic (YES in

block 716), then the logic may establish a security agreement with the host using the access information, in block 718. The logic also forwards a PIM join request upstream toward the RP and joins the shared tree on behalf of the host, in block 720. The logic 700 terminates at block 799.

5 It should be noted that such an “on demand” mechanism for distributing access information may be used as the sole means of distributing access information, such that the key server 118 need not periodically distribute the access information to the multicast routers. Thus, with reference again to FIG. 7, the logic may proceed directly to block 713 upon receiving the join request from the host, in block 704, as shown by the dashed line from block 704 to block 713.

10 Another solution is for the DR to forward the join request upstream toward the RP, and for each upstream multicast router to attempt to authenticate the join request using the access information in its access information database. If a multicast router successfully authenticates the join request, then the host (along with any intermediate multicast routers) are added to the shared tree. If a multicast router is unable to authenticate the join request, then the multicast router forwards the join request upstream toward the RP. The RP provides the last chance for the join request to be authenticated.

15 FIG. 8 shows exemplary multicast router logic for authenticating the join request. Beginning at block 802, and upon receiving a join request from the host including a token identifier, in block 804, the logic retrieves access information for the host/group pair from the access information database based upon the token identifier, in block 806. If the logic fails to find the access information in the access information database (NO in block 808), then the logic forwards the join request upstream toward the RP, in block 817. If the logic finds the access information in the access information database (YES in block 808), then
20 the logic may check the expiration date for the access token to determine whether or not the access token has expired, in block 810. If the access token has expired (YES in block 812), then the logic forwards the join request upstream toward the RP, in block 817. If the access token has not expired (NO in block 812), then the logic authenticates the join request using the access information, in block 814. If the join request is not authentic (NO
25 in block 816), then the logic forwards the join request upstream toward the RP, in block
30

817. If the join request is authentic (YES in block 816), then the logic may establish a security agreement with the host using the access information, in block 818. The logic also forwards a PIM join request upstream toward the RP and joins the shared tree on behalf of the host, in block 820. The logic 800 terminates at block 899.

5 It should be noted that the term "router" is used herein to describe a communication device that may be used in a communication system, and should not be construed to limit the present invention to any particular communication device type. Thus, a communication device may include, without limitation, a bridge, router, bridge-router (brouter), switch, node, or other communication device.

10 It should also be noted that the term "packet" is used herein to describe a communication message that may be used by a communication device (*e.g.*, created, transmitted, received, stored, or processed by the communication device) or conveyed by a communication medium, and should not be construed to limit the present invention to any particular communication message type, communication message format, or
15 communication protocol. Thus, a communication message may include, without limitation, a frame, packet, datagram, user datagram, cell, or other type of communication message.

20 It should also be noted that the logic flow diagrams are used herein to demonstrate various aspects of the invention, and should not be construed to limit the present invention to any particular logic flow or logic implementation. The described logic may be partitioned into different logic blocks (*e.g.*, programs, modules, functions, or subroutines) without changing the overall results or otherwise departing from the true scope of the invention. Often times, logic elements may be added, modified, omitted, performed in a
25 different order, or implemented using different logic constructs (*e.g.*, logic gates, looping primitives, conditional logic, and other logic constructs) without changing the overall results or otherwise departing from the true scope of the invention.

30 The present invention may be embodied in many different forms, including, but in no way limited to, computer program logic for use with a processor (*e.g.*, a microprocessor, microcontroller, digital signal processor, or general purpose computer), programmable logic for use with a programmable logic device (*e.g.*, a Field Programmable

Gate Array (FPGA) or other PLD), discrete components, integrated circuitry (*e.g.*, an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC)), or any other means including any combination thereof. In a typical embodiment of the present invention, predominantly all of the described logic is implemented as a set of computer program instructions that is converted into a computer executable form, stored as such in a computer readable medium, and executed by a microprocessor within the corresponding communication device (host, key server, DR, multicast router, RP) under the control of an operating system.

Computer program logic implementing all or part of the functionality previously described herein may be embodied in various forms, including, but in no way limited to, a source code form, a computer executable form, and various intermediate forms (*e.g.*, forms generated by an assembler, compiler, linker, or locator). Source code may include a series of computer program instructions implemented in any of various programming languages (*e.g.*, an object code, an assembly language, or a high-level language such as Fortran, C, C++, JAVA, or HTML) for use with various operating systems or operating environments. The source code may define and use various data structures and communication messages. The source code may be in a computer executable form (*e.g.*, via an interpreter), or the source code may be converted (*e.g.*, via a translator, assembler, or compiler) into a computer executable form.

The computer program may be fixed in any form (*e.g.*, source code form, computer executable form, or an intermediate form) either permanently or transitorily in a tangible storage medium, such as a semiconductor memory device (*e.g.*, a RAM, ROM, PROM, EEPROM, or Flash-Programmable RAM), a magnetic memory device (*e.g.*, a diskette or fixed disk), an optical memory device (*e.g.*, a CD-ROM), or other memory device. The computer program may be fixed in any form in a signal that is transmittable to a computer using any of various communication technologies, including, but in no way limited to, analog technologies, digital technologies, optical technologies, wireless technologies, networking technologies, and internetworking technologies. The computer program may be distributed in any form as a removable storage medium with accompanying printed or electronic documentation (*e.g.*, shrink wrapped software), preloaded with a computer

system (*e.g.*, on system ROM or fixed disk), or distributed from a server or electronic bulletin board over the communication system (*e.g.*, the Internet or World Wide Web).

Hardware logic (including programmable logic for use with a programmable logic device) implementing all or part of the functionality previously described herein may be designed using traditional manual methods, or may be designed, captured, simulated, or documented electronically using various tools, such as Computer Aided Design (CAD), a hardware description language (*e.g.*, VHDL or AHDL), or a PLD programming language (*e.g.*, PALASM, ABEL, or CUPL).

Programmable logic may be fixed either permanently or transitorily in a tangible storage medium, such as a semiconductor memory device (*e.g.*, a RAM, ROM, PROM, EEPROM, or Flash-Programmable RAM), a magnetic memory device (*e.g.*, a diskette or fixed disk), an optical memory device (*e.g.*, a CD-ROM), or other memory device. The programmable logic may be fixed in a signal that is transmittable to a computer using any of various communication technologies, including, but in no way limited to, analog technologies, digital technologies, optical technologies, wireless technologies, networking technologies, and internetworking technologies. The programmable logic may be distributed as a removable storage medium with accompanying printed or electronic documentation (*e.g.*, shrink wrapped software), preloaded with a computer system (*e.g.*, on system ROM or fixed disk), or distributed from a server or electronic bulletin board over the communication system (*e.g.*, the Internet or World Wide Web).

Thus, the present invention may be embodied as a communication system including a plurality of multicast devices forming a shared multicast distribution tree, a host device, and a designated device through which the host device accesses the shared tree. The host device obtains access information for the host device to access the shared tree. The designated device obtains the access information for the host device to access the shared tree. The host device sends an access control message to the designated device to join the shared tree. The designated device uses the access information to authenticate the host device before adding the host device to the shared tree. The communication system may also include a key server for authenticating the host device and generating the access information for the host device to access the shared tree. The designated device

joins the shared tree on behalf of the host device upon authenticating the host device. The designated device may forward the access control message to a neighboring device upon failing to authenticate the host device using the access information, in which case the neighboring device obtains the access information and authenticates the host device using the access information.

The present invention may also be embodied as a key server logic for authenticating a host device, generating access information for the host device to join a multicast group, sending the access information to the host device, and sending the access information to a designated device for the host device.

The present invention may also be embodied as host logic for obtaining access information for joining a multicast group from an access information server, generating an access control message for joining the multicast group using the access information, and sending the access control message to a designated device for joining the multicast group. The logic may also establish a security agreement with the designated device using the access information.

The present invention may also be embodied as designated device logic for receiving an access control message from a host device, determining whether the host device is authorized to access a shared multicast distribution tree based upon access information for the host device, and joining the shared tree on behalf of the host device if the host device is determined to be authorized to access the shared tree. The designated device may obtain the access information before or after receiving the access control message. The designated device may search for the access information for the host device in an access information database. The designated device may determine whether or not the access information for the host device is expired based upon an expiration date. The designated device may authenticate the host using the access information and a predetermined authentication scheme. The designated device may forward the access control message to a neighboring device if the designated device determines that the host is not authorized to access the shared tree or the designated device is unable to determine whether or not the host is authorized to access the shared tree.

The present invention may also be embodied as a communication message having a group key for a multicast group and access information for a host device.

The present invention may also be embodied as an access control message including access information for a host device.

5 The present invention may be embodied in other specific forms without departing from the true scope of the invention. The described embodiments are to be considered in all respects only as illustrative and not restrictive.

U.S. Patent & Trademark Office